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THE EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ON THE BASEBALL ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
I. Introduction
In 1922, the Supreme Court, in Federal Baseball Club of Balti-
more, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,' ruled
that the professional baseball industry was exempt from the applica-
tion of the antitrust laws. 2 In 1972, in Flood v. Kuhn, 3 the Court
reaffirmed baseball's antitrust exemption. 4 The Court, however, has
refused to extend an antitrust exemption to the other professional
sports.5 Baseball remains the only professional sport exempt from
antitrust scrutiny. 6
During the 1970's, athletes in all other major professional sports
succeeded in effectuating major modifications in their reserve sys-
tems, 7 primarily through antitrust challenges." The unique status of
1. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
2. Id. at 208-09.
3. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
4. Id. at 284.
5. See Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice 1971) (professional basketball subject to antitrust laws); Radovich v. National
Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional football not exempt from anti-
trust scrutiny); United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348
U.S. 236 (1955) (professional boxing subject to antitrust review). See infra notes 41-
65 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
6. As a result of the baseball antitrust exemption, organized baseball is permit-
ted to operate in a classic cartel fashion through a series of interlocking agreements
binding the baseball clubs to each other with respect to almost every phase of the
business operations of the baseball club. See M. Miller, Statement before the Sub-
comm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary 7
(Feb. 24, 1982) (available in the Fordham Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as
Miller].
The major league clubs are bound to each other pursuant to the Major League
Agreement. The National Association Agreement binds every minor league club to
every other minor league club. The Professional Baseball Agreement binds every
major league club to every minor league club. As a result of these agreements, as well
as rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to these agreements, each professional
club is able to rely on every other club to refrain from tampering with contracted
players in return for its agreement to do the same. Therefore, formal agreements not
to compete are present in areas where baseball clubs would normally be expected to
compete. "Markets are divided, prices fixed, and free and open economic competi-
tion effectively eliminated." See Miller, supra at 7-8.
7. The baseball reserve system, as it existed prior to 1976, included several
related contractual provisions which operated to restrict not only the contractual
freedom of the baseball players, but also the ability of the owners to negotiate for the
players. The primary component of the reserve system is the reserve clause. A reserve
clause is a rule or agreement among all the clubs that the services of each player are
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in effect the permanent property of the team holding his contract. See Allison,
Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Status of the Reserve System, 25 BAYLOR
L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1973) (reserve system in professional baseball perpetually binds
player to club); Note, Reserve Clauses in Athletic Contracts, 2 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 302,
303 (1970) (reserve clause effectively binds player for life); Note, Baseball's Antitrust
Exemption and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of an Anachronism, 12 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 859, 862 (1971) (reserve clause forces player to either play for team holding
his contract or retire from professional baseball).
The practical result of the pre-1976 rules was that, once a player signed a contract
with a team, he was forced to bargain exclusively with that team and could not sell
his services to any other baseball club. See, Pierce, Organized Professional Team
Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 566, 583 (1958) (reserve clause gives
perpetual option on player's services); Steinberg, Application of the Antitrust and
Labor Exemptions to Collective Bargaining of the Reserve System in Professional
Baseball, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1301, 1302 (1982) (baseball player bound to employer
throughout career unless traded, released or sold). For a discussion of reserve systems
in other sports, see Lee, A Survey of Professional Team Sport Player-Control
Mechanisms Under Antitrust and Labor Law Principles: Peace at Last, 11 VAL. L.
REV. 373 (1977); Note, Reserve Clauses in Athletic Contracts, 2 RUT. -CAM. L.J. 302
(1970). For a case discussing the reserve system as it existed prior to 1976, see Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 259 n.1 (1972).
The 1976 collective bargaining agreement between the Players' Association and the
Professional Baseball Clubs changed the reserve system. Under this agreement, al-
though the ballplayer is still drafted by a single professional club with whom he must
bargain exclusively, he may choose to wait until the next player draft and bargain
with the new club that selects him. If he then chooses not to negotiate, the player
must give up a career in professional baseball. See Miller, supra note 6, at 11-12.
However, if he has been in the league for six years or has been discharged from
service, the player may declare that he is a free agent. As a free agent he may, subject
to certain league restrictions, sign a contract with any club. Basic Agreement Be-
tween the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the National League
of Professional Baseball Clubs and the Major League Players' Association, art.
XVIII(B)-(C) (Jan. 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Basic Agreement]. Unless the
player achieves free agent status, he may not seek employment as a professional
baseball player in the United States, Canada, Latin America or Japan. This is
because of interlocking agreements among all professional baseball clubs, nationally
and internationally, prohibiting the signing of reserved players. See Miller, supra
note 6, at 12.
The right of a team to assign a player's contract has also been limited. A player
who has played at least 10 years in the major leagues, the last five of which have been
with one club, cannot be assigned to another major league club without his written
consent. 1980 Basic Agreement, supra, art. XVII, A(1). Additionally, a player with
five or more years of major league service cannot be assigned to other than a major
league club without the player's written consent. Id. art. XVII, A(2). The 1980 Basic
Agreement has been extended, with some modifications, until December 31, 1984.
See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Major League Clubs-Player Relations
Committee and the Major League Baseball Players' Association 13 (July 31, 1981)
(available in the Fordham Law School Library).
8. See Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D.D.C. 1976), modified,
593 F.2d 1173 (1978) (NFL draft system violates antitrust laws); Mackey v. National
Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007-08 (D. Minn. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d
606 (1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1979) (enjoining enforcement of NFL rule
providing that any club signing free agent compensate agent's former employer);
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(basketball player restraint systems violate antitrust laws under any circumstances);
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major league9 baseball under the antitrust laws has prevented baseball
players from pursuit of such an antitrust line of attack.' 0 The baseball
Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), afJ'd, 586
F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979) (rule requiring any club
acquiring free agent to compensate former club is patently unreasonable); Philadel-
phia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462,
517-18 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (National Hockey League market monopoly violated anti-
trust laws).
9. The term "major leagues" for the purpose of this Note will include the
National and American Leagues, the individual baseball clubs in those leagues and
the Major League Commissioner's office.
10. This Note focuses only on the relationship among the major leagues, the
major league players, and the players' collective bargaining representative, the Major
League Players' Association. However, the baseball antitrust exemption is also used
by the league against cities, current owners, prospective owners and other leagues.
Thus, for example, in Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144
N.W.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1966), the state of Wisconsin filed a state statutory antitrust
suit against the Atlanta Braves and the National League following that team's move
to Atlanta from Milwaukee. The complaint charged that by moving the Braves to
Atlanta without replacing the team in Milwaukee, the defendants had violated
Wisconsin's antitrust laws. The Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed the state's case,
declaring that professional baseball was exempt from state and federal antitrust laws.
Id. at 732, 144 N.W. 2d at 18. If this action had occurred in any other sport, the
antitrust claim would have been heard.
In Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball Ass'n 147 F.
Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), a corporation organized to purchase the Baltimore
Bullets of the National Basketball Association (hereinafter NBA), was denied league
approval. The corporation charged that the NBA had conspired to monopolize
professional basketball. An NBA motion to dismiss was denied on the grounds that
the plaintiff was entitled to its day in court. Id. at 155.
In 1976, the Oakland Athletics of the American League agreed to sell Joe Rudi and
Rollie Fingers to the Boston Red Sox for two million dollars and Vida Blue to the New
York Yankees for 1.5 million dollars. The sale was negated by League Commissioner
Bowie Kuhn, who declared that the sale was not in "the best interests of baseball."
Charles Finley, the owner of the Athletics, filed suit declaring that the Commission-
er's action violated federal antitrust laws. See Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569
F.2d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). Finley's antitrust
action was dismissed by the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 541. The court declared that the
Supreme Court had intended to exempt the business of baseball, not any particular
facet of that business, from the federal antitrust laws. Id.
Professional baseball has remained unchallenged by a competing league. During
the 1960's and 1970's, actions by other established professional sports leagues were
often challenged by the new leagues. See, e.g., American Football League v. Na-
tional Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir.
1963) (American Football League charged that National Football League had mo-
nopolized professional football). A new baseball league would not be able to mount
similar challenges. In Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir.
1974), Portland's minor league team filed an antitrust action against Major League
Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, charging that the awarding of major league
franchises to Seattle and San Diego constituted an invasion of the Pacific Coast
League territory. The claim was summarily dismissed. Id. at 1102-03. For a com-
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players and the Major League Baseball Players' Association (Players'
Association), the collective bargaining representative of the ballplay-
ers, have vigorously contested this incongruity." Some commentators
have suggested, however, that the baseball players no longer need to
rely upon the antitrust laws to effectuate modifications in their reserve
system.12 These commentators argue that the Players' Association can
modify the reserve system through the collective bargaining process. 13
However, under the labor exemption to the antitrust laws, certain
provisions embodied in a collective bargaining agreement are ex-
empted from antitrust scrutiny.14 The commentators declare that,
because the players have had the opportunity to bargain over the
reserve system, the labor exemption would prevent the players from
an antitrust attack of the reserve system.' 5 They conclude that, be-
cause of the equal bargaining strength of the parties, the labor exemp-
tion would operate to shelter from scrutiny even a term that was
unilaterally imposed by the owners."1
plete discussion of the relationships between the major leagues and parties other than
the ballplayers, such as cities, owners and prospective owners, see L. Sobel, State-
ment before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary 28-38 (July 15, 1981) (available at the Fordham Law School
Library) [hereinafter cited as Sobel].
11. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Miller, supra note 6, at 7-20 (no
valid basis upon which to conclude baseball's privileged status is warranted).
12. See Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by
Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1971) (antitrust issue in reserve
system context is issue whose "time has come and gone"); McCormick, Baseball's
Third Strike, The Triumph of Collective Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1162 (1982) (employees capable of protecting interests without
using antitrust laws). See generally Note, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws,
Shielding an Anticompetitive Provision Devised by an Employer Group in its Own
Interest: McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C.L. REV. 680 (1980).
13. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 12, at 21-28 (players may alter reserve
system through collective bargaining); McCormick, supra note 12, at 1168-69 (collec-
tive bargaining will shape contours of reserve system).
14. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965) (under limited
circumstances, union-oriented provisions are protected from antitrust scrutiny); 15
U.S.C. § 17 (1976), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
15. See supra note 12 for a discussion of these commentaries.
16. See Berry & Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of Players,
Owners, Brawls and Strikes, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 774-75 (1981) ("[t]o hold
that the labor exemption is not available when parties fail to renegotiate a contract
• . . is inconsistent with [labor law] principles"). See also J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL,
THE LAW OF SPORTS 590 (1979) (if substance of unilateral action is influenced by give
and take of prior bargaining, labor exemption is justified).
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If, as these commentators suggest, the labor exemption applies in
the baseball context, then baseball's unique antitrust exemption is
irrelevant. The labor exemption would remain to shelter the reserve
system from the antitrust laws even if the baseball antitrust exemption
was removed.17
This Note discusses the use of the labor exemption by the major
leagues as a defense to antitrust attacks on the reserve system.' 8 After
tracing baseball's unique status under the antitrust laws,19 this Note
examines the history of the labor exemption as developed in non-
professional sport cases20 and as applied to professional sports. 21 It
concludes that the major leagues may not use the labor exemption to
protect the reserve system from antitrust scrutiny. 22 The general un-
availability of the labor exemption to shelter the collective bargaining
agreement between the players and the major leagues maintains base-
ball's unique status under the antitrust laws and perpetuates a legal
inequity.
II. The Baseball Antitrust Exemption
A. Federal Baseball and Toolson
The relationship of federal antitrust law to professional sports was
first considered in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs.23 Prior to this case, the
17. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 12, at 29 (labor exemption, rather than
baseball antitrust exemption, is critical barrier to antitrust challenge); McCormick,
supra note 12, at 1168 (labor exemption would foreclose attack even if baseball
antitrust exemption was removed).
18. This Note deals only with major league ballplayers. The majority of profes-
sional baseball players, however, are in the minor leagues. The minor leagues oper-
ate as a grooming ground for major league ballplayers. There are approximately 4000
minor league and 750 major league players active during the baseball season. The
minor league players have neither a collective bargaining representative nor a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Telephone interview with Robert Sparks, Promotion
Staff Member, National Association of Professional Baseball Clubs (Feb. 28, 1984).
Therefore the labor exemption is not applicable. See Miller, supra note 6, at 11.
19. See injra notes 23-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of baseball's
status under the antitrust laws.
20. See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the labor
exemption in non-sport cases.
21. See infra notes 122-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the develop-
ment of the labor exemption in professional sport cases.
22. See infra notes 161-201 and accompanying text for this conclusion.
23. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
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baseball market consisted of three leagues: the National League, the
American League and the Federal League.24 The Baltimore franchise
of the Federal League charged that the American and National
Leagues had engaged in a conspiracy to destroy the Federal League.
25
Baltimore claimed that the leagues had effected this plan by purchas-
ing some of the constituent clubs and encouraging all other clubs,
except the plaintiff, to abandon the league .2 The Baltimore franchise
argued that the American and National Leagues thus had violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
2 7
The Supreme Court declared that the baseball industry was not
amenable to antitrust attack. 2 The Court reasoned that baseball
games were purely intrastate activities and were not commerce
24. In 1876, the National League, consisting of fifteen teams, was founded. ThE
BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 11 (J. Reichler 5th ed. 1982). By 1879, because of fierce
bidding wars, seven teams had dissolved. In 1881, the American Association was
founded. To insure financial solvency, the leagues entered into an agreement which
permitted teams to protect the contracts of certain players arid thus prohibit other
teams from hiring or attempting to hire protected players. Id. In 1884, the Union
Association was organized. It dissolved after only one season. See McCormick, supra
note 12, at 1141. In 1889, because of repressive owner tactics, the Players League was
formed. This league had been formed by the Brotherhood of Professional Baseball
Players, the first union of professional athletes. However, following the 1891 season,
this league also failed. Id. at 1141-43. During the 1891 season the American Associa-
tion withdrew from the agreement it had entered into with the National League. As
a result, four American Association teams joined the National League. The American
Association subsequently dissolved. Id. at 1143-44. In 1900, the American League
was formed. In 1903, because of the success of the American League, the American
and National Leagues signed an agreement which prohibited any team in either
league from hiring or attempting to hire a player who was reserved to another club.
Id. at 1144. In 1913, the Federal League was organized. In 1915, however, the
Federal League, upon agreement with the other leagues, was effectively dissolved. As
part of the agreement, a number of the Federal League owners were allowed to
purchase American or National League franchises. The owners of the Federal League
teams also received payment. Id. at 1144-46. For a general discussion of early
baseball leagues, see LOWENFISH & LUPIEN, THE IMPFRFECT DIAMOND (1980).
25. Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207.
26. id.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). The Sherman Act provides:
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States...
is declared to be illegal.
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be
deemed guilty of a felony.
28. Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
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"[with]in the commonly accepted use of [the term]. -29 Therefore, the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which requires that the illegal activity be the
result of interstate commerce, 30 was inapplicable. 3' The baseball anti-
trust exemption, created by the Supreme Court, would remain in
effect long after courts concluded that baseball did operate in inter-
state commerce.
32
In 1953, the Supreme Court in Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc. ,'33 reaffirmed Federal Baseball. The Court concluded that con-
29. Id. Justice Holmes reasoned that a baseball game was not related to produc-
tion but rather was a public exhibition of the ballplayer's personal effort. The fact
that the ballplayer had to cross state lines to participate in these exhibitions was
merely an incident of the business. He concluded: "[t]hat which ... is not commerce
does not become commerce ... because [of interstate] transportation .... " Id.
30. See supra note 27 for the text of the Sherman Act.
31. The plaintiff argued that the interstate relationship among the several clubs
was predominant, that the business of organized baseball represented an enormous
investment, that the reason for the investment was to make a profit, that the receipts
of each exhibition were shared by both teams and that baseball was in essence a
business which had to be distinguished from the mere physical activity necessary to
play the sport. Therefore, the plaintiff alleged, baseball was a business operating in
interstate commerce. Id. at 201-06.
32. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (professional baseball is business
engaged in interstate commerce); The American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs & Ass'n of Nat'l Baseball League Umpires, 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 192-93 (1969)
(professional baseball is industry in or affecting interstate commerce); Note, Base-
ball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of an Anachronism,
12 WM & MARY L. REV. 859, 865 (1971) (reasoning which led to Federal Baseball is
no longer valid).
33. 346 U.S. 356 (1953). Toolson was a consolidation of three separate cases.
Toolson, a minor league pitcher in the New York Yankee organization, was black-
listed for failing to report to Binghampton upon the assignment of his contract from
Newark. Toolson alleged that the blacklisting prevented him from reaching the
major leagues and deprived him of his means of livelihood. Toolson v. New York
Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), afJ'd, 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952).
In Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413, 414 (6th Cir. 1953) (per curiam), aff'd sub
nom., Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), Kowalski, a minor
league player, claimed that the league and the owners had used the draft restrictions
and reserve clauses to deprive him of the reasonable value of his services and opportu-
nities for promotion.
In Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953) (per curiam), aJJ'd sub nom.,
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), the El Paso Class C
baseball club had contracted with four players who were bound under reservation
claims to Mexican League clubs. The Mexican League and the National and Ameri-
can Leagues had an agreement to respect the reservation claims of each team. As a
result, the four Mexican League ballplayers were returned to the Mexican League.
Corbett, the owner of the team, brought suit, claiming that the monopolistic prac-
tices of the defendants deprived the El Paso club of the services of the four players
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gressional action was necessary to remove the exemption. 34 The Court
found that legislative inaction indicated congressional reluctance to
remove the exemption. 35 A dissent argued that the baseball industry
was involved in interstate commerce and that, therefore, the antitrust
laws were applicable. 36
B. Other Professional Sports
The decision in Federal Baseball was further isolated by subsequent
Supreme Court decisions which refused to extend the antitrust exemp-
tion to other professional sports. Following Federal Baseball, the
Court refused to immunize boxing, 37 football 38 and basketball39 from
antitrust scrutiny. 40 In United States v. International Boxing Club of
and the opportunity to sell their contracts. See Note, Baseball-An Exception to the
Antitrust Laws, 18 U. PiTT. L. REV. 131, 144 (1956).
34. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. See also Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (if exemption is to be eliminated, it must be eliminated by
congressional, not judicial, action).
35. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. The Court reasoned that overruling Federal Base-
ball would cause more harm than good as "[t]he business has thus been left for thirty
years to develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust
legislation." Id.
36. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (Burton, J., dissenting). Justice Burton argued that
it is contradictory to claim that the defendants are not engaged in interstate com-
merce when large capital investments are made to conduct games between teams, the
teams travel interstate, the equipment is purchased interstate, radio and television
coverage extends baseball's audiences outside the state, and advertising is conducted
interstate. Id. at 357-58. Justice Burton concluded that the antitrust exemption had
been improvidently granted by the Court. Therefore in the absence of congressional
action granting an exemption, baseball should be required to comply with the
antitrust laws. Id. at 364-65. Justice Burton argued that there was no judicially
implied exemption for "any sport that is so highly organized as to amount to an
interstate monopoly or which restrains interstate trade or commerce." Id. Because
baseball has become a large monopoly, it should be required to comply with the
antitrust laws. Id. For a discussion of Toolson, see Note, The Supreme Court, 1953
Term, 68 HARV. L. REV. 105, 136-38 (1954); Note, Legislation-Interpretation and
Construction of Statutes- Use of the Doctrine of Legislative Silence in Implying
Adoption of a Judicial Interpretation-Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356 (1953), 32 TEXAS L. REV. 890 (1954).
37. United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236
(1955). See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
38. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). See infra notes
50-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
39. Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice 1971). See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
case.
40. Lower courts have also refused to extend Federal Baseball. See Drysdale v.
Florida Team Tennis, Inc. 410 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Robertson v. National
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New York, 41 the Supreme Court concluded that Federal Baseball and
Toolson did not immunize all professional sports from application of
the Sherman Act. 42
In International Boxing, the Government brought a civil antitrust
suit 43 against three corporations and two individuals engaged in the
promotion of professional championship boxing events. 44 The defend-
ants asserted that the exemption established in Federal Baseball ap-
plied to all professional sports. 45 The Court, however, concluded that
Federal Baseball could not be relied upon as a basis for exempting
other segments of the professional sports industry. 46 The Court distin-
guished International Boxing from Federal Baseball by reasoning that
the issue in International Boxing was not whether a previously
granted exemption should continue, but whether an exemption should
be granted at all. 47 The Court concluded that only Congress could
grant an exemption. 48 A dissent noted that it was virtually impossible
Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf
Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Nassau Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp.
733 (D. Minn. 1972).
41. 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
42. Id. at 242.
43. The complaint alleged that the defendants had "restrained and monopolized
. 'the promotion, exhibition, broadcasting, telecasting, and motion picture pro-
duction and distribution of professional championship boxing contests in the United
States'-through a conspiracy to exclude competition in their line of business." Id. at
239.
44. Id. at 237. "The corporate defendants [were] the International Boxing Club
of New York, Inc., the International Boxing Club, and Madison Square Garden
Corporation." Id. at 237 n.1. The conspiracy, as charged by the government, com-
menced with an agreement between the defendants and heavyweight champion Joe
Louis. As part of the agreement, Louis agreed to resign his title. The four leading
contenders for the vacant championship were then convinced to engage in an elimi-
nation contest. The defendants obtained exclusive broadcast rights to those contests.
The complaint alleged that the defendants had effectuated this scheme by forcing
each contender to agree, as a prerequisite to fighting for the title, that if he won the
title, he would take part only in future contests which were promoted by the
defendants. Id. at 239-40.
45. Id. at 242.
46. Id. at 242-43.
47. Id. at 243.
48. Id. at 244. The Court noted that Congress had addressed the issue of the
applicability of the antitrust laws to professional sports in 1951. Following extensive
discussion by the Subcommittee of the House Judiciary on the Study of Monopoly
Power, the Subcommittee refused to extend an exemption to the professional sports
industry. With respect to baseball, however, the Subcommittee recommended a
postponement of action until further judicial clarification of Federal Baseball. Id. at
243-44. See H. R. REP. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1951).
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to distinguish baseball from other professional sports under an anti-
trust analysis. 4
Radovich v. National Football League0 tested the applicability of
the Sherman Antitrust Act to professional football. Radovich began
his professional career in 1938 with the Detroit Lions of the National
Football League (NFL). In 1946 Radovich broke his contract and
signed with the Los Angeles Dons of the All-America Conference, 51 a
competitor of the NFL. In 1948 Radovich was offered the position of
player-coach of the San Francisco Clippers of the Pacific Coast
League, which was affiliated with the NFL and was not a competitor.
The Clippers retracted the offer when they discovered that Radovich
had been blacklisted by the NFL and that the club would suffer harsh
penalties if they hired him.52
Radovich initiated an antitrust action against the NFL, asserting
that the League conspired to monopolize and control organized pro-
fessional football in violation of sections one and two of the Sherman
Act.5 3 Radovich claimed that the NFL had tried to destroy the All-
America Conference, and that the NFL had boycotted Radovich and
prevented him from securing employment in the Pacific Coast
League.5 4 The Court ruled that federal antitrust law applied to the
business of professional football. 55 The Court declared that the Fed-
49. International Boxing, 348 U.S. at 248-51 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice
Frankfurter declared that "fijt would baffle the subtlest ingenuity to find a single
differentiating factor between other sporting exhibitions ... and baseball insofar as
the conduct of the sport is relevant to the criteria or considerations by which the
Sherman Law becomes applicable to a 'trade or commerce'." Id. at 248. For a
further discussion of International Boxing, see Note, Monopolies-Sherman Anti-
trust Act-Multistate Promotion of Professional Championship Boxing Contests, 29
TUL. L. REV. 793 (1955); Comment, Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-
Boxing Exhibitions and Theatrical Productions Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 35
B.U.L. REV. 447 (1955); Comment, Constitutional Law-Boxing and Interstate
Commerce, 26 Miss. L.J. 271 (1955); Comment, Constitutional Law-Promotion of
Professional Boxing Contests Constitutes "Commerce" Within the Scope of the Sher-
man Act, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 103 (1955).
50. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
51. Id. at 448. Following the 1945 season Radovich asked to be traded to a team
in the Los Angeles area so that he could be near his ailing father. The Detroit Lions
refused to trade Radovich to a team in or near Los Angeles. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 446-47.
54. Id. at 447.
55. Id. at 451-52. The Court specifically limited Federal Baseball to the business
of organized baseball. Id. at 451.
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eral Baseball decision was only applicable to the baseball industry and
refused to extend it beyond its facts.56
In Haywood v. National Basketball Association,5 7 Spencer Hay-
wood challenged the validity of certain components of the National
Basketball Association's (NBA) player draft and reserve clause,58 par-
ticularly its "four year rule" denying players eligibility as draftees
until the graduation of their college class s.5 After playing on the 1968
United States Olympic basketball team, Haywood enrolled at the
University of Detroit. Prior to graduation, he signed a contract with
the American Basketball Association (ABA), a competitor of the
NBA. 60 Haywood later repudiated the contract and signed with the
Seattle Supersonics of the NBA. 6 1 The NBA threatened to terminate
Haywood's contract because a league rule declared that a player could
not be signed for four years after his college class had enrolled.62
Haywood commenced an antitrust suit and a federal district court
issued an injunction which permitted him to play for the season. 63 The
Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction, which was reinstated by the
56. Id. Justice Clark noted that, if the Court had been considering the question
of the application of the antitrust laws to baseball for the first time, there would be
little doubt that an exemption would not have been granted. Id. at 452. For a further
discussion of Radovich, see Note, Anti-trust Laws-Sherman Antitrust Act-Profes-
sional Sports, 36 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1958); Note, Antitrust Laws-Interstate Com-
merce-Professional Football, 11 Sw. L.J. 516 (1957).
57. 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1971).
58. Id. at 1204-05.
59. Id. By-law 2.05 of the National Basketball Association Rules provided:
[A] person who has entered college but is no longer enrolled, shall not be
eligible to be drafted or to be a Player until the time when he would have
first become eligible had he remained enrolled in college. Any negotiations
or agreements with any such person during such period shall be null and
void and shall confer no rights to the services of such person at any time
thereafter.
See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (citing text of by-law).
60. Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1204-05.
61. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (C.D. Cal.
1971). In 1969, Haywood was voted Rookie of the Year and Most Valuable Player of
the league. Consequently, he renegotiated his contract with the ABA's Denver Rock-
ets. Haywood was promised a contract of $1,900,000 but received a contract of
$394,000. However, he signed the contract believing that the agreed upon salary was
included. He later learned of the deception and after an unsuccessful attempt at
further renegotiation, rescinded his contract. Id. at 1052-54. The Denver Rockets
brought suit to force him to play for the team and to enjoin him from playing
elsewhere.
62. Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1205.
63. Id.
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Supreme Court.6 4 The Court declared that professional basketball was
not exempt from the antitrust laws and that Federal Baseball would
not be extended to include other professional sports.65
C. Flood v. Kuhn
In 1972, the Supreme Court, for the third time in fifty years,66 was
given an opportunity to rule on the scope of federal antitrust law as
applied to the professional baseball industry. In Flood v. Kuhn,6 7 the
Court again held that the baseball industry is exempt from application
of the Sherman Act.68
In October 1969, Curt Flood was traded from the St. Louis Cardi-
nals to the Philadelphia Phillies.69 In December, Flood complained to
the Commissioner of Baseball and asked that he be declared a free
agent,70 and permitted to pursue contractual negotiations with other
major league clubs. Flood's request was denied. 7' He subsequently
filed suit charging that the reserve system72 and the players' lack of
contractual freedom constituted an unlawful restraint of trade. 73 The
Court acknowledged that professional baseball is a business in inter-
state commerce.74 It declared that baseball's antitrust exemption was
indeed an anomaly, but that the aberration was an established one
that rested on the recognition and acceptance of baseball's unique
64. Id. at 1206-07.
65. Id. at 1205.
66. See Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
67. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
68. Id. at 284.
69. Id. at 265.
70. A free agent in professional sports is a player who has completed his contrac-
tual obligation to a team. The player is thereafter, subject to league rules and
restrictions, permitted to pursue employment with other teams. See WEISTART &
LOWELL, supra note 16, §5.03(d) at 523. See 1980 Basic Agreement, supra note 7, at
XVIII(B) for the current rules pertaining to free agency.
71. Flood, 407 U.S. at 265. Flood had played for the St. Louis Cardinals for
twelve years. He was neither informed of the trade, nor permitted to contest it.
72. See supra, note 7 for a definition of the reserve clause.
73. Flood, 407 U.S. at 265-66. Flood alleged violations of federal antitrust laws,
civil rights statutes, state antitrust statutes, as well as violation of the thirteenth
amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. Id.
74. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. The National Labor Relations Board, in American
League of Professional Baseball Clubs & Ass'n of Nat'l Baseball League Umpires, 180
N.L.R.B. 190, 192 (1969), had concluded three years earlier that baseball was a
business in interstate commerce.
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characteristics and needs. 75 The Court was reluctant to overturn Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson because Congress allowed these decisions to
stand for "so long without changing them."176 Congressional inaction
thus implied that Congress intended to continue the baseball antitrust
exemption .77
The antitrust exemption has been described by the Supreme Court
as an historical anomaly.78 Despite almost universal judicial and aca-
demic agreement of its inequitable application and logical inconsist-
ency, 79 the Court has refused to remove the exemption. Instead, the
75. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
76. Id. at 282-85. In his dissent, Justice Douglas declared that Federal Baseball
"is a derelict in the stream of the law that we, its creator, should remove." Id. at 286.
Justice Douglas stated that equity mandated a reversal of Federal Baseball, declaring
that baseball players had been victimized by the reserve clause. Id. at 287.
Justice Marshall, in a separate dissent, declared that, despite a general reluctance
to overrule prior constructions of federal statutes, the Supreme Court must overrule
Federal Baseball as its effect was to deny substantial federal rights as guaranteed by
the antitrust laws. Id. at 292-93. For a discussion of Flood, see Keeffe, The Flood
Case at Ebb Tide, 59 A.B.A.J. 91 (1973); Morris, In the Wake of the Flood, 38 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 85 (1973).
77. Id. at 283. In 1976, Baseball's antitrust exemption was discussed by the
House Select Committee on Professional Sports (commonly referred to as the Sisk
Committee). The final report of the Committee states:
Baseball's justification for retention of its antitrust exemption rests funda-
mentally on the premise that it has relied for many years on that exemp-
tion and evolved a way of doing business that would be jeopardized if it
were suddenly subjected to current antitrust standards. Moreover, it is
argued, the status quo should be maintained because no protectable public
interest or group has been harmed as a result of its enjoyment of the
exemption, and in fact there has been tangible public benefit from its
operations under the exemption .... The reliance defense is faulty both
from a legal point of view and in its implicit suggestion that no other
method of business operation is possible for it which would be compatible
with our nation's antitrust policy and at the same time allow baseball to be
a viable profitable enterprise.
Hearings before the Select Comm. on Professional Sports, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53
(1977). The Committee concluded that adequate justification did not exist for base-
ball's special exemption from the antitrust laws and that its exemption should be
removed in the context of overall antitrust reform. Id. at 60. The Select Committee,
however, refused to specifically recommend legislation. The Committee recom-
mended that a successor committee be appointed to prepare a report on sports
antitrust law and to make specific recommendations. Id.
78. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972); Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
79. See Salerno v. Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971) (Federal Baseball was "not one of Mr.
Holmes' happiest days" and the rationale for Toolson is "extremely dubious"). See
also Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1949) (baseball antitrust
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Court has steadfastly declared that Congress must act in order to end
the exemption. 80
III. The Labor Exemption
In Flood v. Kuhn, 81 Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, noted
that the advent of the Players' Association 82 as the collective bargain-
ing representative of the baseball players and the subsequent signing
of a colletively bargained agreement raised the possibility that the
labor exemption 83 might be available to shelter baseball's reserve sys-
tem from antitrust attack.8 4 The Court did not apply the parameters
of the labor exemption to the professional sports industry in general or
to baseball in particular.8 5 The next section will trace the history of
the labor exemption and determine the extent of its application to
baseball and other professional sports.
exemption is "impotent zombie"). The baseball antitrust exemption has been the
subject of numerous law review articles. For a discussion of this exemption, see Note,
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REV. 737, 746 (1971) (only rationale left for Federal Baseball is that forty-nine
years ago Court held that baseball was not interstate activity); Note, Antitrust and
Professional Sport: Does Anyone Play by the Rules of the Game?, 22 CATH. U.L.
REV. 403, 426 (1973) (antitrust laws should apply equally to all sports); Note,
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reappraisal of an Anachro-
nism, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859, 877 (1971) (subsequent economic developments
and expansion of antitrust jurisdiction demand review of the exemption).
80. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text for the Supreme Court's con-
clusion that the baseball antitrust exemption can only be ended by congressional
action.
81. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
82. In 1969 the National Labor Relations Board declared baseball to be an
industry in interstate commerce and therefore subject to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. See American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. at 192-
93. The Board subsequently recognized the Major League Baseball Players' Associa-
tion as a labor organization, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982), and as the exclusive
bargaining representative for all members of the association. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1982). See Note, Nearly a Century in Reserve: Organized Baseball: Collective
Bargaining and the Antitrust Exemption Enter the 80's, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313,
334-35 (1981).
83. See supra note 14.
84. Flood, 407 U.S. at 293-94. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. The labor exemption, though briefed by the parties, was not mentioned in
the majority opinion. Id. at 258-84.
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A. Historical Background
The labor exemption is derived from three federal statutes: sections
six and twenty of the Clayton Act,8 6 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 87
86. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976), enacted in 1914,
provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural or horticultural organiza-
tions, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations, from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws.
Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976), enacted in 1914, provides in
part:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any Court of the
United States, or the judge or the judges thereof in any case between an
employer and employees, or between . . . persons employed and persons
seeking employment. involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning
terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable
injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the applica-
tion, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such
property or property right must be described with particularity in the
application, which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by
his agent or attorney.
87. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), enacted in 1932, pro-
vides:
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent
injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a
strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary
to the public policy declared in this chapter.
Section 113(c) of this act explains that
[t]he term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
The Sherman Antitrust Act, as originally passed, did not specifically exempt union
activity from the antitrust laws. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3 IBEW, 325 U.S.
797, 801 (1945). Federal courts applied the Act to unions and issued injunctions
restraining union activity. In response to vigorous protest from employee groups
against application of the Act to them, Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914. Id.
at 802-03. This act was broadly interpreted by many as labor's "magna carta",
wholly exempting the unions from inclusion within the antitrust acts. Id. at 804. The
Supreme Court, however, declined to interpret the Clayton Act as providing a total
exemption and, in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), and
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n of N. Am., 274 U.S. 37
(1927), applied the Sherman Act to labor organizations.
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Congress drafted the labor exemption in recognition that a union must
be permitted to use certain economic tactics, such as strikes, picketing
and boycotts, to secure the rights of the employees. 8 Use of such
tactics infringes on the antitrust laws, but enforcement of the antitrust
violation is sacrificed to insure the strength of the union in the collec-
tive bargaining process.89
These statutes, however, protect only unilateral union activity and
do not extend to agreements between union and employer groups.90
The Supreme Court extended the labor exemption to include the
product of the union's efforts, the collectively bargained agreement.9'
In response to these decisions and the resulting union pressure, Congress in 1932
passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which emphasized the importance of insuring the
rights of employees to organize into unions and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection. Id. at 805.
See Siegel, Connoly & Walker, The Antitrust Exemption for Labor-Magna Carta or
Carte Blanche?, 13 DuQ. L. REV. 411, 415-20 (1975); Winter, Collective Bargaining
and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73
YALE L.J. 14, 30-32 (1963).
88. See Handler & Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The
Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 469 (1981) (Con-
gress, recognizing that certain union activity may be illegal under antitrust laws,
drafted labor exemption to protect such activity). For a full discussion of the legisla-
tive history, see Kovner, The Legislative History of Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1947).
89. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 621-22, reh. den., 423 U.S. 884 (1975) (statutory labor exemption protects
specific union activity from application of antitrust laws); United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 661-62 (1965) (labor exemption shelters only certain union
activity from application of Sherman Act). The scope of the statutory labor exemp-
tion was articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219 (1941). In Hutcheson the Court dismissed criminal antitrust indictments against
a union which had picketed an employer following an unsuccessful battle with a rival
union to secure the right to erect and dismantle machinery for the Anheuser-Busch
Brewing Company. Id. at 232-37. The Court concluded that,
[s]o long as a union acts in its self interest and does not combine with non-
labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the Clayton Act] are not
to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom,
the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of
which the particular union activities are the means.
Id. at 232 (footnote omitted). See also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
489-93 (1940) (violent sitdown strike, in violation of state law, to compel closed shop
agreement was beyond substantive reach of Sherman Act).
90. See Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 622 (statutory labor exemption does not
exempt agreements between unions and non-labor groups from application of anti-
trust laws); Pennington, 381 U.S. at 662 (statutory labor exemption only applicable
to union acting alone).
91. See Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 622 (some union-employer agreements
granted exemption from antitrust laws); Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665 (union wage
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In Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No.
100 12 the Court declared that "a proper accomodation between the
Congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA
and the Congressional policy favoring free competition in business
markets requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a
limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions.
9 3
The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the promotion of a
strong national labor policy favoring the association of employees to
eliminate competition over wages and working conditions.9 4 Union
success in organization and negotiation will affect price competition
among employers, with its attendent antitrust implications, but the
success of federal labor policy is dependant on a relaxation of the
antitrust laws. 95 The nonstatutory exemption is of limited applica-
tion.' The union-employer agreement will be accorded an exemption
from antitrust scrutiny only if the labor interests override antitrust
concerns. 97
The Supreme Court, in Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co. ,98 discussed the various
factors necessary for balancing labor interests against antitrust con-
cerns. In Jewel Tea, a food retailer brought an antitrust action against
a union with which it had signed a collective bargaining agreement. 9
The employer alleged that a restriction within the agreement, which
prohibited the sale of meat before 9:00 A.M. and after 6:00 P.M.,
constituted an illegal restraint of trade.'00
agreements with employer protected under certain circumstances by labor exemp-
tion).
92. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
93. Id. at 622. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 688-90 (1965).
94. See Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 622; Pennington, 381 U.S. at 666.
95. See Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 622; Pennington, 381 U.S at 666; Jewel
Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90; Allen Bradley Co v. Local 3 IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 805
(1945).
96. See Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 622 (exemption to be given limited
application); Allen Bradley Co., 325 U.S. at 809 (exemptions granted unions were
special exemptions).
97. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (before applying labor exemption to immunize
union-employer agreement, court must examine circumstances of case and determine
that federal labor law policy deserves preeminence over federal antitrust concerns).
98. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
99. Id. at 680-82.
100. Id. at 681-82. During contract negotiations, Jewel Tea and other members of
the multi-employer bargaining unit sought a relaxation of this restriction. Jewel Tea
was particularly interested in a relaxation of the time restriction as 174 of their 196
stores were equipped to sell meat in a self-service manner. These stores did not need a
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Use of the labor exemption acknowledges a violation of the antitrust
laws. '0 An overriding concern with promotion of national labor pol-
icy, however, mandates that the antitrust violations inherent in any
collective bargaining agreement be tolerated. 102 The Court concluded
that for the labor exemption to apply, the labor interests must over-
ride the antitrust effect of the agreement. 10 3 Labor interests will be
held pre-eminent if the disputed subject is intimately related to wages,
hours and conditions of employment and is proffered by the union in
pursuit of its own labor policies and not at the behest of or in combi-
nation with a non-labor group. 0 4 If these criteria are satisfied, the
labor interests will override the natural antitrust effect. 05
butcher on duty to monitor the sale of meat. The union refused to remove the
condition. Jewel Tea, under threat of strike and despite its protests that such a
restriction violated antitrust laws, reluctantly signed the agreement. Id. at 680-82.
101. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the antitrust
implications inherent in the use of the labor exemption.
102. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption.
103. See supra note 97.
104. See Id.
105. The Court concluded that the particular hours of the day and the particular
days an employee would work were intimately related to wages, hours and working
conditions. Id. at 691. The Supreme Court has discussed the scope of the labor
exemption in two other important cases. In Allen Bradley Co., v. Local 3 IBEW, 325
U.S. 797 (1945), manufacturers of electrical equipment from outside New York
charged that Union Local No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, through agreements and industry-wide understandings with New York
electrical manufacturers and contractors, had in effect closed the New York City
market to out-of-town manufacturers. Id. at 798-800. The Supreme Court concluded
that Congress had intended for agreements between unions and nonlabor groups such
as the electrical manufacturers and contractors to have limited protection from
antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 809-10. The labor exemption could not be used by the
unions to aid nonlabor groups to create business monopolies or to control the market-
ing of goods and services. Id. The Court noted that an individual agreement between
a union and an employer prohibiting the purchase of foreign goods would be shel-
tered by the labor exemption, and thus provide the union with protection from
antitrust attack. Id. at 809. However, an agreement which was part of a general
conspiracy to aid a complete and unfair insulation of a particular industry would not
enjoy similar protection. Id.
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the Court
further limited the scope of the labor exemption by refusing to permit use of the
exemption to a union which had "agreed with one set of employers to impose a
certain wage scale on other bargaining units." Id. at 665. In Pennington, Phillips
Brothers Coal Company charged that the United Mine Workers had conspired with a
group of larger coal companies to impose certain terms on the smaller companies in
an effort to eliminate the smaller companies from the market. Id. at 659-61. The
Court focused on the conspiratorial nature of the agreements and noted that a union
may conclude a wage agreement with an employer and seek similar wages from other
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Jewel Tea demonstrates that a court determining the application of
the labor exemption should review the action of the union to deter-
mine if the provision is one which a union, in pursuit of its employees'
best interests, would naturally attempt to secure. 106
IV. The Labor Exemption and Its Application to Professional
Sports
The cases in which the Supreme Court delineated the scope of the
labor exemption all involved labor organizations seeking shelter
within the exemption. 07 In the professional sports industry, however,
the team owners and the leagues, both employer groups, seek to use
employers. Id. at 664. However, a union may not conspire with one set of employers
to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units. Id at 665. A union cannot,
as part of a collective bargaining agreement, restrict discretion in negotiation outside
the bargaining unit. Id. at 665-67.
106. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90 (1965). In 1975 the Supreme Court concluded
that a union did not merit protection of the labor exemption. In Connell Constr. Co.,
421 U.S. 616 (1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975), the union was a party to a
multi-employer collective bargaining agreement with a local mechanical subcontrac-
tors' association. Id. at 619. The union attempted to convince Connell, a general
contractor, to subcontract mechanical work only to firms that had an existing agree-
ment with the union. Id. at 619-20. Connell refused and was picketed by the union.
Id. at 620. Eventually, Connell signed the agreement under protest. Id. Connell
subsequently brought suit charging the union with a violation of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 619-21. The Court declared that, while the agreement reflected the valid union
interest in organizing non union subcontractors, id. at 625, the method used operated
as a direct restraint on the business market. Id. at 623. The union had effectively
insured, by securing agreements with various general contractors, that non union
subcontractors would be ineligible to compete for work. The Court concluded that
the antitrust concerns outweighed the labor interests and that the agreement was
therefore outside the protection of the labor exemption. Id. at 623-26. The Court
noted, in balancing the requisite factors, that the agreement between Connell and
the union had not even been the product of collective bargaining. Id. at 635. The
union had not organized Connell's workers, nor did it have any intention of doing so.
Id. at 631. The Court concluded, however, that the antitrust effect in Connell was
such that even if the restriction had been the product of collective bargaining, the
union would not have been granted an exemption. Id. at 625-26. Connell demon-
strates that the extent of the antitrust effect is an important factor in the balancing
process and that, despite substantial labor interests, the effect of the agreement may
be such as to prevent the application of the labor exemption. Id. at 625.
The Connell decision has engendered considerable debate. For a discussion of
Connell, see Janofsky & Hay, Connell- Consistent with the Past, Indicative of the
Future, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL CONFER-
ENCE ON LABOR 3 (1976); St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of
Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603 (1976); Note, Labor Law-Antitrust Liability of
Labor Unions-Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 17 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 217 (1976).
107. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases.
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the exemption to prevent antitrust scrutiny.' 8 There is little in the
history of the labor exemption to suggest that the exemption may be
used by an employer to override employee interests. 0 9
The owners have argued that the labor exemption should no longer
be limited to provisions which are solely in the interest of the union
and its employees." 0 They assert that both parties to the collectively
bargained agreement, having successfully participated in the collec-
tive bargaining process, should be rewarded through equal use of the
nonstatutory labor exemption."' Some commentators have further
suggested that the mere participation in the collective bargaining
process, regardless of whether an agreement is reached, would war-
rant equal protection from antitrust scrutiny.1 2 Therefore, they ar-
gue, an employer, after bargaining to impasse, could unilaterally
impose a term of employment and protect that term from antitrust
scrutiny under the labor exemption." 3
A. Employer Use of the Labor Exemption Generally
The labor exemption originally provided statutory protection for
unilateral union action." 4 The Supreme Court in Jewel Tea recog-
nized the need to judicially extend the exemption to protect the collec-
tive bargaining agreement from antitrust scrutiny.' 15 Only provisions
108. See MeCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-1203 (6th Cir.
1979) (National Hockey League attempted to block antitrust attack on free agent
compensation system); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1979) (National Football League attempted
to protect free agent compensation provision from antitrust review); Robertson v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (NBA at-
tempted to shelter player restraint system from antitrust purview); Kapp v. National
Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 84 (N.D. Cal. 1974), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907
(1979) (NFL attempted to shelter free agent compensation provision from antitrust
scrutiny).
109. See supra notes 86-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history
of the labor exemption.
110. See supra note 12.
111. Id.
112. See WESTART & LOWELL, supra note 16, § 5.06 (c) at 590; Berry & Gould,
supra note 16 at 774-75 (labor exemption should be available despite failure to
negotiate collective bargaining agreement); McCormick, supra note 12, at 1161-69.
113. See supra note 16 and accompanying text-.
114. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory
labor exemption.
115. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-93.
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initiated by the union in the best interests of the employees are pro-
tected by the labor exemption."16
Courts have recognized that an employer may be permitted a lim-
ited use of the exemption to insure employees' benefits." 7 An em-
ployer may benefit from the labor exemption only to the extent neces-
sary to secure the rights of the employees."' The employer is not
sheltered by the labor exemption as of right or as a result of participa-
tion in the collective bargaining process."19 For example, if a union
signs a collectively bargained agreement with employer A which in-
cludes a standard wage settlement, employer B may believe that the
wage agreement will ultimately affect price competition among com-
petitors and violate antitrust law. The union, however, would be
immune from antitrust attack by B under the labor exemption. 20
Employer B would also be unable to sue Employer A since, to protect
the rights of the employees, it is necessary that certain provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement be sheltered from a collateral
antitrust action.' 2' To protect these provisions, employer A must be
permitted to use the exemption.
116. See id. at 689-90 (labor exemption only protects union pursuing benefits for
employees).
117. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth Inc., 690 F.2d
489, 530 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983) ("[labor] exemptions are
for the benefit of employees and their unions, and offer no shelter for the acts of
employers, except perhaps only incidentally"); Robertson v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (employers are to be afforded deriva-
tive use of exemption, which becomes effective only when they are sued by third
parties for acts of union); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 499-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (employer may not
use exemption offensively by engaging in anticompetetive or monopolistic practices).
118. The Court in Connell noted that "the nonstatutory exemption has its source
in the strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competi-
tion over wages and working conditions." Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
119. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489,
530-31 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983) (labor exemption only for
benefit of employees and union); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp
867, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (exemption extends only to union activities); Cordova v.
Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 605-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (sole purpose of labor
exemption is to protect activity of labor).
120. See supra notes 86-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of union
protection under the labor exemption.
121. The employer-employee relationship in the labor exemption context was
recently discussed by the Fifth Circuit in Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-
Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983). In
Pratt-Farnsworth two unions which represented construction workers in the New
Orleans area charged that Pratt-Farnsworth, a New Orleans construction company
with whom they had a collective bargaining agreement, and Associate General
Contractors of Louisiana Inc. (AGC), a trade organization consisting of construction
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B. Sport Cases
The extent to which an employer may use the labor exemption has
received extensive discussion in the area of professional sports. In
Robertson v. National Basketball Association,12 2 the NBA sought to
use the labor exemption to block an antitrust action brought by active
and retired basketball players.12 3 These players charged that the uni-
form player contract, 124 reserve clause 25 and college draft 126 violated
the antitrust laws. 127 The players also sought an injunction to prevent
the NBA from merging or entering into a noncompetition agreement
with the American Basketball Association.' 28
companies throughout Louisiana, had conspired to restrain competition in the con-
tractor services market in New Orleans. Id. at 497-99. Pratt-Farnsworth and AGC
had effected the conspiracy by carving out an enclave of non-union carpentry work
to which union contractors were denied access. The unions claimed that the con-
struction companies had entered into agreements among themselves and with other
construction companies in the New Orleans area to employ only nonunion contrac-
tors and subcontractors. These agreements resulted in a reduction of work opportu-
nity for union members, decreased wages and less favorable working conditions. Id.
at 529. The Fifth Circuit refused to permit the construction companies use of the
exemption. The Court declared that the nonstatutory exemption to the antitrust laws
was for the benefit of the employees and their unions. Employers could only be
sheltered by the exemption as incidental beneficiaries. As the antitrust claims did not
even allege that the defendants had entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with the union, the exemption could not be utilized. Id. at 530-31.
122. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
123. Plaintiffs included players with significant experience and recognition in the
league. Id. at 872-73.
124. The Uniform Player Contract must be signed by every drafted player. The
contract requires that the player may only play with the club with which he has a
contract and that the club has the exclusive and unlimited right to assign the
contract. Furthermore, if the player refuses to play, the club may either terminate
the contract or enjoin the player from playing basketball for any other team. Id. at
874.
125. The reserve clause is part of the Uniform Contract. If the player refuses to
sign the contract, the club is entitled to extend the contract for another year on the
same terms and conditions. Prior to 1971, the contract could be renewed unilaterally
at a 25% reduction in salary. Id. at 874. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the
baseball reserve clause.
126. The college draft gives each NBA club the exclusive right to select the college
players with whom it wishes to negotiate. If the player chooses not to negotiate with
the club that selected him, he may not negotiate with any other NBA club. Id. at
874.
127. The players charged that the NBA had engaged in a conspiracy to monopo-
lize and restrain trade in professional basketball by controlling the terms upon which
professional basketball is played, dividing up the market, enforcing league proce-
dures through boycotts, blacklisting and refusals to deal. Id. at 873-74.
128. Id. at 876.
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The Court concluded that the NBA could not use the labor exemp-
tion because it extended only to labor or union activities and not to the
activities of employers.' 29 The employer would only be permitted a
derivative use of the exemption if a collectively bargained agreement
with the union had been secured and a provision of that agreement,
involving an area of proper union concern, was attacked by a third
party. 130
In Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc.,' 3 1 the reserve system 32 of the National Hockey League
was challenged by a competitor, the World Hockey Association, as
violative of federal antitrust law. 33 The National Hockey League
claimed that these provisions were exempt from antitrust scrutiny
under the labor exemption.
The Court rejected the league's claim and declared that:
[t]he labor exemption which could be defensively utilized by the
union and employer as a shield against Sherman Act proceedings
when there was bona fide collective bargaining, could not be seized
upon by either party and destructively wielded as a sword by
engaging in monopolistic or other anti-competitive conduct. The
shield cannot be transmuted into a sword and still permit the
beneficiary to invoke the narrowly carved out labor exemption
from the anti-trust laws. 134
The Court concluded that the National Hockey League was not the
ideal candidate to be a beneficiary of the labor exemption because it
129. Id. at 884-85.
130. Id. at 886. The Court quoted Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600,
605-06 (1970). The "sole purpose and effect of the [labor exemption] is to exempt
activities and agreements on the part of labor ... organizations .... Congress...
was concerned with the right of labor and similar organizations . . .[and] not with
the right of employers ...... Id. at 886.
131. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
132. Under the Standard Players' Contract, which the hockey player was required
to sign, the player was required, on the request of the club, to enter into a contract
after completion of the season, upon the same conditions as the contract he was
signing. The only term that could be discussed was salary. Id at 480.
133. Id. at 466-67. Philadelphia World Hockey was a consolidation of five cases.
The World Hockey Association, a newly formed competitor of the established Na-
tional Hockey League, claimed that the league had so structured its relationship with
the hockey players with whom it had contracted as to preclude the players from
signing with the World Hockey Association. Id. at 466-68. For a complete discussion
of the market control of the National Hockey League in 1972, see id. at 474-86;
Roberts & Powers, Defining the Relationship Between Antitrust Law and Labor
Law: Professional Sports and the Current Legal Battleground, 19 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 395, 405-06 (1978).
134. Philadelphia World Hockey, 351 F. Supp. at 499-500.
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was "primarily responsible for devising and perpetuating a monopoly
over the product market of all professional hockey players via the
reserve system. 1135
Employers have argued that the labor exemption extends to provi-
sions in the collective bargaining agreement which neither were initi-
ated by the union, nor directly benefit the union. 136 They claim that
the entire collective bargaining agreement, and not only the union-
initiated provisions, must be protected. Thus, once an agreement has
been completed, both parties should be protected equally. 137
This argument, however, is not supported by Supreme Court inter-
pretations of the labor exemption or by legislative history. 3 It was
never the intent of the Supreme Court or Congress to permit non-
labor groups the equal protection of the labor exemption. 3 The
employer group is limited to using the exemption to the extent neces-
sary to insure protection of employee rights. 140
The reserve system is a provision devised and advanced in the best
interests of management. 14' It is not the type of provision a union
would pursue, since its effect is to frustrate rather than to further
135. Id. at 500.
136. See supra note 12 for a discussion of these commentaries.
137. The Sixth Circuit, in McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th.
Cir. 1979), has adopted the owners' position. McCourt involved a challenge to the
National Hockey League reserve system. The reserve system, despite the union's
disapproval, was eventually included in the collective bargaining agreement. The
court concluded that the inclusion of the reserve compensation clause was the prod-
uct of good faith, arm's length bargaining, and thus was protected from antitrust
scrutiny by the labor exemption. Id. at 1203. The court reasoned that despite the
player objections and union disapproval of the clause, the inclusion of the clause in
the collective bargaining agreement mandated the league's protection, as long as
there had been good faith bargaining. Under McCourt, for the labor exemption to
apply, the union and employer should be on equal footing and have participated in
good faith negotiations. Id. at 1198-1203. Thus, for example, if a new union were to
arise to represent the new United States Football League (USFL), it is possible that
this union would not have the requisite power to be on equal footing. In this case, the
McCourt decision would be inapplicable.
138. See supra notes 86-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of labor
exemption cases and the legislative history of the exemption.
139. See supra notes 86-89. As Judge Carter noted in Robertson, "if the exemption
is to be applicable to both employers and labor organizations, Congress must make
this purpose clear through amendment of the Clayton Act." 389 F. Supp. at 886 n.32
(1975). See also WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 16, § 5.05 (d) at 549 (legislative
history and Supreme Court cases indicate that primary purpose of labor exemption is
to protect unions).
140. See supra notes 114-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limita-
tions on employer use of the labor exemption.
141. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the history of the reserve clause.
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union interests.142 Moreover, the Supreme Court has allowed the labor
exemption to be invoked only when a union has made an agreement
with an employer that has a deleterious antitrust effect on other
unions or employers. 43 In the context of the reserve system, the labor
exemption is used by the employer against the individuals for whom
the exemption was drafted to protect. The employers are using the
exemption as an offensive tactic. 44
C. Limitations on the Use of the Labor Exemption in Professional
Sports
If an employer can use the labor exemption, the circumstance of
such use will be controlled by the Connell balancing test. 45 The test
requires a balancing of labor and antitrust interests. For the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption to apply, the labor interests must override the
antitrust concerns. 46
1. The Mackey Balancing Test
Courts have had difficulty in determining the parameters of the
Connell balancing test, and the Supreme Court has provided little
142. The court in Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Ship-
ping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970), noted that
[t]he test of whether the labor union action is or is not within the prohibi-
tions of the Sherman Act is . . . whether the [provision] is in the union's
self-interest in an area which is a proper subject of union concern and...
whether the union is acting in combination with a group of employers.
Id. at 887.
143. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d
489, 530 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct 335 (1983) (labor exemption applies
only when union makes agreement with employer having deleterious effect on other
unions or employers); WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 16, § 5.06 (b) at 586 (Supreme
Court has indicated that effect of agreement on third party, not intra-party effect
catalyzes permissible use of exemption).
144. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462, 499-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (employer not permitted offensive use of
labor exemption).
145. See Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 622 (proper balance between labor and
antitrust concerns requires that some union agreements be accorded limited exemp-
tion from antitrust laws). In Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90, the Court concluded
that, despite the union's ability to seek shelter within the exemption, use of the
exemption was limited to those provisions which were intimately related to the
wages, hours and working conditions of the employees and were of the type which a
union, acting in the best interests of its employees, would normally pursue. Id.
146. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) ("availability of the nonstatutory [labor] exemp-
tion . . . turns upon whether the relevant federal labor policy is deserving of pre-
eminence over federal antitrust policy under the circumstances of the particular
case").
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clarification. 47 In Mackey v. National Football League 148 the Eighth
Circuit attempted to formulate a test which would relate specifically
to the professional sports industry while satisfying the requisites of
Connell. 149
In Mackey, sixteen football players challenged an NFL rule which
permitted Pete Rozelle, the league commissioner, to compel clubs
acquiring free agents to compensate the free agent's prior team. 150 The
players alleged that the "Rozelle Rule"'15 effectively denied profes-
sional football players the right to freely contract for their services and
thus constituted an illegal restraint of trade.152 The NFL claimed that
if an antitrust violation did indeed exist, it was protected by the labor
exemption. 153
The Court noted that under appropriate circumstances, an em-
ployer who is a party to a collectively bargained agreement may avail
itself of the labor exemption. 54 These circumstances would exist if
federal labor interests were pre-eminent to antitrust concerns. 55 The
Court in Mackey fashioned a three-pronged test balancing labor inter-
ests and antitrust law. The Court concluded that labor interests would
be considered paramount if: (1) the restraint on trade primarily af-
fected only parties to the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the
agreement sought to be exempted concerned a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining; 56 and (3) the agreement was the product of
bona fide arm's length bargaining.157
147. See Note, B.C. L. REv., supra note 12, at 714. The author noted that the
Connell balancing mechanism had been developed to steer a course between the
Sherman Act and the labor policy favoring collective bargaining. However, "no clear
. ..consensus exists, either at the Supreme Court or among the lower courts, as to
how the labor and antitrust scales can be weighted." Id.
148. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
149. Id. at 613-14.
150. Id. at 609 n.2. Plaintiffs included players with significant experience and
recognition in the league.
151. The rule provided that, when a player signs with a different club after his
contractual obligation with an NFL club expires, the new club must provide com-
pensation to the player's former team. If the teams are unable to reach an agreement,
the NFL Commissioner may award compensation in the form of players and/or draft
choices. Id. at 609 n.1.
152. Id. at 609.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 612.
155. Id. at 613.
156. Mandatory subjects include those subjects which vitally affect employees,
including conditions outside the bargaining unit which have a substantial impact on
the employees. See MoRius, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 761 (1983).
157. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
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The Court concluded that the "Rozelle Rule" affected only the
parties to the agreement and that the agreement concerned a manda-
tory subject of collective bargaining. 58 However, the Rule failed to
satisfy the third prong of the test because it had not been the product
of bona fide arm's length bargaining.
[T]he Rozelle Rule was unilaterally imposed by the NFL and mem-
ber club defendants upon the players . . . . The Rule imposes
significant restrictions ... and has ... remained unchanged since
it was unilaterally promulgated .... The provisions of the collec-
tive bargaining agreements ... do not in and of themselves inure
to the benefit of the . . . union. 1 9
The Court concluded that the inclusion of the "Rozelle Rule" within
the collective bargaining agreement could not serve to immunize the
provision from antitrust scrutiny. 160
2. Baseball and the Mackey Test
An analysis of the major league baseball collective bargaining
agreement demonstrates that the owners and the league should not be
permitted use of the labor exemption. The first prong of the Mackey
test requires that the restraint of trade, embodied in the collective
bargaining agreement, affect only parties to the agreement.' 6 ' The
baseball reserve system, however, affects the ballplayer's relationship
with other clubs which might desire the use of his services. This
extends the effect of the agreement beyond the traditional employer-
employee sphere. 6 2 Other provisions incorporated within the collec-
tive bargaining agreement also affect players outside the bargaining
unit. For example, a baseball player who is drafted by a major league
club may only bargain with the club that holds the draft rights to
him. 16 3 The player is not a party to the collective bargaining between
the owners and the players until he signs a contract. 6 4 Therefore the
158. Id. at 615.
159. Id. at 616 (quoting lower court opinion, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1010 (D. Minn.
1975)). The court recognized that if the agreements had inured to the union's benefit,
the employer would have been able to use the labor exemption. Id.
160. Id.
161. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
162. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 16, § 5.05 (e) at 552 (player restraints
affect players' relationships with other clubs in league).
163. See BASEBALL BLUE Boox, INC., 1983 BASEBALL BLUE BOOK 513-27 (1983).
164. Closius, Not at the Behest of Non-Labor Groups: A Revised Prognosis for a
Maturing Sports Industry, 24 B.C. L. REv. 341, 378 (1983) (player is not member of
league until he is drafted, signs contract, and makes team).
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draft, which is incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement,
has an external restrictive effect on baseball players, non-parties to the
agreement, drafted by a major league club.1 65
The second prong of the Mackey test mandates that the provision
subject to attack must be a mandatory subject of bargaining.66 While
only mandatory subjects are of sufficient import to merit protection
under the labor exemption, the fact that the provision in issue is a
mandatory subject of bargaining does not warrant per se immunity. 16 7
The requirement in Jewel Tea is that the subject be of the type that a
union, in pursuit of the employees' best interests, would normally
attempt to secure. 6 8 The reserve system is not in the employees' best
interest. The mandatory nature of a subject of bargaining does not
make that subject one which a union would initiate in pursuit of its
own interests.
The third prong of the Mackey test requires that there be good
faith, arm's length bargaining over the subject at issue and that the
parties to the collective bargaining agreement be on "equal footing" in
the negotiation process. 69 The court in Kapp v. National Football
League170 declared that the original unilateral imposition of player
165. 1980 Basic Agreement, supra note 7, art. XV. The draft, which is codified in
Major League Rules 3 & 4, see supra note 163, is incorporated into the collective
bargaining agreement via article XV.
166. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
167. In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, the Court noted that, while the term
at issue was of great relevance in determining application of the labor exemption,
"there are limits to what a union or employer may offer or extract in the name of
wages, and because the parties must bargain over a term does not mean that they
may disregard other laws." 381 U.S. 657, 665 (1965).
168. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of Jewel Tea
and limitations on the use of the labor exemption.
169. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
170. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Joe Kapp, a professional quarterback who
had played for the Minnesota Vikings and the New England Patriots, brought suit
against the NFL and its commissioner, Pete Rozelle. Kapp charged that, through
antitrust conspiracy and monopolistic practice, the defendants had caused him to be
discharged by the New England Patriots and effectively driven out of professional
football in the United States. Id. at 75. Precipitating the suit was Kapp's refusal to
sign a Standard Player's Contract for the 1971 season. When Kapp persisted in his
refusal, he was told by the Patriots to leave training camp. Pursuant to league rules,
Kapp was maintained on the reserve list of the club and the Patriots were permitted
to claim compensation if Kapp signed with any other NFL club. Id. at 77-78. Kapp
claimed that the "Rozelle Rule" and the Standard Player Contract constituted a
conspiracy among the defendants to effectively boycott such players. Id. at 78. The
defendants argued that these rules were immunized as they were part of a collective
bargaining agreement between the NFL and the NFL Players' Association. Id. at 78-
79.
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control restraints was an illegality which could never be neutral-
ized. 7' In Kapp, the court concluded that:
[H]owever broad may be the exemption from antitrust laws of
collective bargaining agreements ... that exemption does not...
permit immunized combinations to enforce employer-employee
agreements which, being unreasonable restrictions on an [em-
ployee] . . . have been held illegal on grounds of public policy
before and entirely apart from the antitrust laws. 72
In McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.,' 73 the dissent declared that
National Hockey League By-Law 9A, 74 a provision similar to the
"Rozelle Rule", should not be protected by the labor exemption. The
dissent declared that a profit-making business such as the National
Hockey League could not justify its cartel arrangement by "securing
that arrangement's introduction into a collective bargaining agree-
ment.' 175 The dissent concluded that permitting the National Hockey
League to use the labor exemption to shelter the provision effectively
"stands the labor union exemption squarely on its head."' 76
The Kapp decision 177 and the McCourt dissent178 illustrate that a
reserve system is not the type of provision which can be protected by
the labor exemption. The baseball reserve system 179 was originally
imposed on the players as part of a secret agreement. 80 It has been
nurtured and protected by the league and the owners through years of
secret agreements and unfair practices.' 8' The perpetuation of the
reserve system has frustrated the labor interests of the players. 82 The
171. Id. at 86.
172. Id.
173. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979). In McCourt, Dale McCourt brought suit after
being assigned from the Detriot Red Wings to the Los Angeles Kings as compensation
for the Red Wings signing of a free agent. Id. at 1196.
174. Under Section 9A of the By-Laws of the National Hockey League, a team
which signs a free agent must compensate the former club of the newly signed player.
If- the clubs are unable to agree to terms, each team must submit a proposal to a
selected neutral arbitrator, who will rule on the amount of compensation to be
awarded. Id. at 1195.
175. Id. at 1212 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 73.
178. McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1206-18.
179. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the baseball reserve system.
180. See McCormick, supra note 12, at 1140.
181. For a general discussion of the reserve clause, see L. LOWENFISH & T. LUPIEN,
THE IMPER=CT DIAMOND (1980).
182. See Miller, supra note 6, at 11-12.
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major leagues should not be able to justify its cartel arrangement
merely because the reserve system is present in a collective bargaining
agreement.
Additionally, the Mackey decision assumes that negotiating parties
"are on equal footing. ' 183 Unlike unions representing other profes-
sional athletes, the Players' Association cannot utilize the antitrust
laws and arguably has diminished bargaining power. 18 4
Under the Connell test, the labor exemption is applicable only if the
antitrust concerns outweigh labor interests. 8 5 Mackey's three-pronged
test attempts to satisfy the Connell balancing requirement. 8' The
reserve system fails the Mackey test 87 and the antitrust concerns
outweigh the labor interests. Therefore, the labor exemption is inap-
plicable and the provision cannot be sheltered from the antitrust laws.
3. Unilateral Imposition of a Term or Condition of Employment
Commentators contend not only that successful collective bargain-
ing should permit the owners and league use of the exemption, but
also that mere participation in the bargaining process, whether an
agreement is reached or not, should warrant equal protection under
the labor exemption. 8  These commentators conclude that owners,
after failing to reach agreement on a particular term in collective
bargaining negotiations, may unilaterally impose that term on the
union and seek to protect that provision from antitrust scrutiny under
the labor exemption.8 9
183. 543 F.2d at 614. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the third prong of the Mackey test.
184. In Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 291-93 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting),
Justice Marshall noted in his dissent that the Supreme Court was depriving the
ballplayers of needed bargaining power by refusing to permit them use of the
antitrust laws and that threat of enforcement of the antitrust laws may provide the
necessary impetus to reach an agreement. Justice Marshall concluded that failure to
apply the antitrust laws to the baseball industry had isolated the baseball player and
left him in an impotent position.
185. Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 622.
186. See supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mackey.
187. See supra notes 176-83. Other commentators have disagreed that the reserve
systems fails the first two prongs of the Mackey test. See, e.g., Closius, supra note
164, at 374. Supporters of the argument that the reserve system falls within the labor
exemption have improperly applied the Supreme Court test as enunciated in Connell
and Jewel Tea. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 112-13.
189. Id.
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An employer, after bargaining to impasse,9 0 may unilaterally im-
pose a term if it is consistent with offers which the union has re-
jected. I'1 Employers argue that this unilateral term may be protected
by the labor exemption. 19 2 However, an employer is permitted only an
incidental use of the labor exemption.19 3 Any rights which an em-
ployer possesses result from the settling of a collectively bargained
agreement with the union. 9 4 Therefore, a prerequisite to assertion of
any rights by the employer is the existence of a valid collectively
bargained agreement. 19 The nonstatutory exemption should not be-
come effective unless there is a collective bargaining agreement. 9 '
Thus, the labor exemption should be unavailable to any provision
which is not part of a collective bargaining agreement. 9 7 A term
which is unilaterally imposed is not part of a collective bargaining
190. An impasse occurs when the parties, despite good faith negotiation, are
deadlocked. NLRB v. Tex-Tan Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 482 (5th Cir. 1963).
191. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962) (unilateral action by employer
without discussion with union violates labor laws); NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines,
Inc., 333 F.2d 729, 734-35 (1st Cir. 1964) (unilateral imposition of term after
impasse not violative of labor laws); NLRB v. United States Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d
610, 615 (1st Cir. 1963) (employer's unilateral imposition of term not in violation of
National Labor Relations Act after good faith negotiation and subsequent impasse);
NLRB v. Intracoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954, 958 (5th Cir. 1961) (employer's
unilateral imposition of term violative of labor laws if term not initially offered to
union). See Moruus, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 563-66 (1983) for a discussion of
employer unilateral imposition.
192. For example, the NBA in 1982 proposed a salary cap on the total amount an
owner would be permitted to pay his team in salary and benefits. The Players'
Association refused to bargain, claiming that the salary cap was an illegal subject of
bargaining. The term later became part of a collective bargaining agreement. If the
union had continued in its refusal to bargain, however, and the salary cap had not
been an illegal subject of bargaining, the league may have imposed the salary cap
without the Players' Associations' approval. Telephone interview with Lawrence
Fleisher, General Counsel of the NBA Players' Ass'n (Feb. 9, 1984).
193. See supra note 121 for a discussion of the incidental use of the exemption.
194. See supra notes 114-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the em-
ployee-employer relationship in the labor exemption context.
195. See Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 622. The Supreme Court in Connell
declared that the nonstatutory labor exemption would apply only to "some agree-
ments." Id. (emphasis added).
196. See Carpenters Local No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 531
(5th. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 335 (1983). The court noted that the labor
exemption was not available to the defendants because there had been no allegation
that the defendants had entered into any agreements with a labor group. Under those
circumstances, reasoned the court, "the nonstatutory [labor] exemption should not
come into play ...... Id.
197. Contra Berry & Gould, supra note 16, at 774-75.
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agreement. 8 Therefore, such a provision cannot receive shelter from
antitrust scrutiny under the labor exemption.
The ramifications of the unilateral imposition of a reserve system by
an owner after an unsuccessful collective bargaining attempt is partic-
ularly harmful to baseball. While these provisions can be attacked
under the antitrust laws by all other professional sports unions, nei-
ther the Major League Baseball Players' Association nor the individual
baseball players can utilize this remedy. 19 Rather, to prevent unilat-
eral imposition, the Players' Association would have no alternative
except to strike.2 00 The ability of other professional sports labor orga-
nizations to use antitrust protections provides an obstacle against such
unilateral imposition and provides the impetus to return to the bar-
gaining table.20 l This encouragement of collective bargaining is absent
in the baseball industry.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court created the baseball antitrust exemption in
Federal Baseball in 1922. In consideration of the Court's own recogni-
tion of the exemption's anomalous status, the Court should overrule
Federal Baseball and end the exemption. Alternatively, Congress
should place the baseball industry in the same position as other profes-
sional sports with respect to the antitrust laws by appropriate legisla-
tive action. The significance of removing the baseball antitrust exemp-
tion is not diminished due to the existence of the parallel labor
exemption.
The labor exemption was passed for the benefit of unions and the
employees they represent. It should not be interpreted to protect
employers. If, however, employers may use the exemption, it should
198. Unilateral imposition by definition means that the parties have not agreed to
the term. Therefore, the provision could not be in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. See Moms, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 563 (1983).
199. See supra notes 23-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the baseball
antitrust exemption.
200. The 1981 strike by the baseball players cost the ballplayers approximately 28
million dollars in salaries. The owners lost approximately 116 million dollars but
were able to offset 44 million of the loss due to an insurance policy. Strike Over,
Baseball Resumes Aug. 9, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1981, at 1, col. 1. The 1981 strike also
had a substantial economic impact on the cities in which major league baseball was
played. For example, New York City's comptroller estimated that the strike cost the
city at least $8,400,000 in lost business and wages. City Loss Put at 8.4 Million, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 1, 1981, at 19, col. 2.
201. See supra note 183 for a discussion of the necessity of using antitrust laws in
collective bargaining.
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be used as a defensive tactic rather than as an offensive strategy.
Usage of the labor exemption to shelter unilaterally imposed terms,
such as a reserve system, effectively turns labor's shield into the em-
ployer's sword.
Scott A. Dunn

